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I. INTRODUCTION
Global Food System Defense is an area where, so far, we have
not yet obtained real traction in this post-September 11, 2001 world
of international terrorism.
Cooperative international efforts to
defend and protect the global food supply system may well be crucial
to the security of every developed nation in the coming years.
Affordable energy-currently fossil fuels-and food are at the heart of
the security and prosperity of every nation. Yet the food protection
efforts that have been historically supported by the international
community have focused on traditional "food security," defined as
access to sufficient calories and nutrition to sustain the populationusually meant as poor, underfed populations.' For the purposes of
this Article, this is not the same as food defense. As Dr. Marc
Ostfield, Senior Advisor for Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health
Security, U.S. Department of State, pointed out in his recent remarks
to the European Institute, "[m]any have used these terms
interchangeably and, I would argue, erroneously, creating confusion
'2
Of
during both national and international policy discussions.
course, in countries and regions of the world where food security is a
significant concern itself, food defense is a relatively low priority
compared to the basics of a sustainable supply of safe and wholesome
foods. Unfortunately, however, the global nature of our food system
means that primary production or ingredient sourcing from such
regions flows directly into countries where food defense has ascended
above the base level of the Maslow hierarchy of needs, from
physiological to safety needs. Of the few defensive steps designed to
protect food supply chains that are in place, these are usually
centered on protecting food stocks from theft or misappropriation by
both local government and insurgent groups. 3 The concept of a largescale effort to defend the global food supply chain from adulteration
or destruction that might target an entire population is relatively
new.

1.
Marc L. Ostfield, Senior Advisor for Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health
Sec., Remarks to the European Institute: Transatlantic Dimensions of Biodefense
Cooperation
and
Collaboration
Event
(Nov.
20,
2006),
available at
http:lwww.state.govlg/oeslrls/rm12006/77206.htm.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
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II

THE THREAT: IS IT REAL?

Malnutrition and food shortages in many areas of the world
already contribute to social and civil unrest. Efforts to fight regional
malnutrition can be undermined if the food itself is suspect. With the
increase in international terrorism and the clear evidence that
terrorist groups, such as radical extremists and those associated with
Al Qaeda, have considered targeting food, it is time for more
aggressive action to defend the world's fragile food supply system
against potential acts by fanatical groups. 4
History reflects
numerous instances where food has been targeted by both nation
states, as components of military strategy, and by insurgent or
terrorist groups. 5 The United States has suffered from several
domestic terrorist acts against food. For example, in an Al Qaeda
training manual found in Manchester, UK, there is a section on how
to employ contaminated food as a weapon. 6 In September 1984, the
Rajneeshee cult contaminated salad bars in restaurants in Wasco
County, Oregon, with Salmonella typhimurium in an effort to
influence a local election. 7 In 2002, U.S. Armed Forces discovered
documents 8 in an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan that
indicated that this group had considered the use of biological and
chemical weapons to target agriculture and food supplies. The threat
is, indeed, real, and many consider the probability of another terrorist
strike against food to be high, as has been reported in a recent paper
by Stinson and Kinsey entited, How Should America's Anti-Terrorism
Budget Be Allocated? Findingsfrom a National Survey of Attitudes of
U.S. Residents about Terrorism.9 It is also worth noting that the

4.
Id. (noting that materials discovered at Al Qaeda training camps in
Afghanistan "show knowledge of specific agents that could be used to contaminate the
food supply").
5.
Id. (providing various U.S. and international examples of intentional
contamination of food in recent history).
6.
See Sixteenth Lesson: Assassination Using Poisons and Cold Steel, in THE
AL QAEDA MANUAL: DECLARATION OF JIHAD (HOLY WAR) AGAINST THE COUNTRY'S
TYRANTS MILITARY SERIES, available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/
jihadmanual.html (providing detailed instructions for preparing and administering
various poisons).
7.
Ostfield, supra note 1.
8.
See generally Al Qaeda Documents Outline Serious Weapons Program,
CNN, Jan. 25, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002JUS/O1/24/inv.al.qaeda.documents/
index.html (discussing the documents found at Tarnak Farms in Central Afghanistan
in 2002).
9.
THOMAS F. STINSON ET AL., How SHOULD AMERICA'S ANTI-TERRORISM
BUDGET BE ALLOCATED? FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF ATTITUDE OF U.S.
RESIDENTS
ABOUT
TERRORISM
(Univ.
of
Minn.
2006),
available at
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/mn/tr06-Ol.pdf.
Former Secretary Tommy G. Thompson
stated upon leaving office in December 2004 that not only did he consider the threat
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Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project stated that
"[o]ur greatest concern is that these groups might acquire biological
agents or less likely, a nuclear device, either of which could cause
mass casualties"10 The Government Accounting Office January 2007
publication, "High Risk Series: An Update," further highlights the
concerns with food, added as a high risk area for the first time.

III. Is TERRORISM TARGETING FOOD A CRIME?
Except

for specific

disaster events

where emergency food

supplies were rapidly transported from one area of the world to
another to stave off starvation in impacted populations (Iran, Asia,
Philippines, Central Africa, Berlin Airlift, etc.), most efforts in the
past have been via government-sponsored international aid
organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and United
Nations (UN) organizations such as the Food & Agriculture
These organizations have not historically
Organization (FAO). 12
engaged in "anti-terrorism" defensive measures because these were
not politically acceptable areas of engagement for them.13 Until the
late 1980s, most nations viewed terrorism as "political" activity, not a
crime, and would not become involved in any manner, defensively or
protectively. 14 Indeed, until relatively recently, INTERPOL did not
even engage in investigations of terrorism because Article 3 of its
constitution, adopted in 1951, precluded the "[o]rganization to
undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military,
religious or racial character."'15 Even today, not all nations have

real but that he was surprised that it had not happened already. William Branigin et
al., Tommy Thompson Resigns From HHS, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A31377-2004Dec3.html.
10.
Nat'l Intelligence Council, Report of the National Intelligence Counsel's
2020 Project: Pervasive Insecurity, http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC-globaltrend2020_s4
.html#trans (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
11.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE (Jan.
2007).
12.
See generally David Fisher, Fast Food: Regulating Food Aid in SuddenImpact Disasters,40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1125 (2007) (discussing the prominence of
the role of governmental sponsored aid, NGOs and UN organizations in providing food
aid).
13.
See,
e.g.,
Food
& Agric.
Org.
of the
U.N.,
About
Us,
http://www.fao.org/UNFAO/about/index-en.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2007) (stating
that the focus of the FAO is to "leadU international efforts to defeat hunger").
14.
See generally Mathieu Deflem & Lindsay C. Maybin, Interpol and the
Policing of International Terrorism: Developments and Dynamics since September 11,
in TERRORISM: RESEARCH, READINGS, & REALITIES 175, 175-76 (Lynne L. Snowden &
Bradley C. Whitsel eds., 2005).
15.
Interpol, Interpol Constitution and General Regulations of the ICPOInterpol art. 3 (1956). Mathieu Deflem and Lindsay C. Maybin, in their excellent paper
entitled Interpol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Developments and
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criminal laws that address such terrorist acts. The issue of making
such terrorist acts an international crime is even more difficult. As
Ben Saul points out, "[m]uch of the international legal debate on
terrorism has focused on ideological disputes or the technical
mechanics of definition, rather than the underlying policy question of
why-or
whether-terrorism
should
be
internationally
criminalized." 16 This debate continues and complicates efforts to
address international efforts to defend the global food supply.

IV.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION HAS BEEN SLOW TO DEVELOP

The impact of ideological disputes continued to thwart real
progress in this arena until the post-9/11 period. Since that time,
steps have been taken, both unilaterally and cooperatively, by
individual nations, the United Nations, and some NGOs. 17 However,
what has been done is at a rather low, relatively ineffectual level, or
has only included a subset of the required stakeholders.
Most
cooperative international efforts have been high on rhetoric but low
on any real action.
In the G8 efforts, for example, a rather robust plan for
international cooperation was proposed under the U.S. Presidency in
2004.18 These proposed steps included the sharing of best practices
from within the private sector groups (within the U.S., this
represents the owners of approximately 85 percent of the food
production and distribution systems), sharing of new regulatory
schemes designed to further the protection of the food supply chains,
the sharing of emergency response planning data and lessons learned
from past events, senior level discussions of future cooperative efforts,
and the conduct of international exercises that would focus on largescale terrorist events targeting global or regional food supply
chains. 19 The G8 presidency has since rested with the United
Kingdom (U.K.) and the Russians, and an increase in Global Food
20
Defense from these efforts has not yet become measurable.

Dynamics since September 11, point out that "efforts in Interpol and many of its
member agencies to target terrorism as a crime may not necessarily harmonize with
the political, diplomatic, and legal activities against terrorism conducted at the level of
the governments of national states." Deflem & Maybin, supra note 14, at 175-76.
16.

BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (Oxford Univ.

Press 2006).
17.
See discussion infra Part TV.
18.
See generally Sea Island Summit 2004, Sea Island, Ga., June 9, 2004.,G8
Action Plan on Nonproliferation, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/
summit/2004/action-7.pdf [hereinafter G8 Action Plan].
19.
Id. § 5.
20.
See Sea Island Summit 2004, Sea Island, Ga., June 9, 2004, Chair's
Summary, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2004/summary.pdf
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There has been little real effort to organize the world's more
capable nations towards defending the international food supply. As
a consequence, little has been done to enable the less capable states
to act, either directly or indirectly. Interestingly, there have been
several efforts to plan and conduct international food defense
exercises to help identify protective gaps, to help train
representatives of participating nations, and to improve international

cooperation. 2 1 As of yet, these efforts have yielded little success, and
there has been no major international exercise specifically designed
around a large-scale terrorist act targeting the global or even a
regional food supply chain. In 2004, at the annual meeting of the
22
the issues of protecting the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),

international food supply chain were discussed, and while no concrete
action was taken, there was agreement to continue the discussion of
potential international action on this matter at future meetings.

Subsequent meetings have not produced any substantive progress on
broad international cooperation. The 2005 session merely concurred
with the results of the 2004 annual meeting, and no concrete action to
23
further defend international food systems was taken or proposed.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has addressed the
issues of food system defense in the Asia-Pacific Region at
conferences and workshops. 24 The U.S. has proposed specific actions
for APEC to adopt but no steps have yet been taken beyond endorsing

(noting that the U.K. would host the 2005 summit); Gleneagles Summit, Perthshire,
Scotland, June 6-8, 2005, Chair's Summary, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/
economy/summit/2005/summary.html (noting that Russia would host the 2006 summit).
21.
See discussion infra Part IV.
22.
The report of the 2004 Meeting of States parties to the Biological Weapons
Convention, issued December 10, 2004, merely states that the State Parties agreed on
the value of: supporting the existing networks of relevant international organizations
for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and combating of infectious diseases and
acting to strengthen the WHO, FAO, and OlE programmes, within their mandates, for
the continued development and strengthening of, and research into, rapid, effective and
reliable activities for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and combating of infectious
diseases, including in cases of emergencies of international concern; improving,
wherever possible, national, and regional disease surveillance capabilities, and, if in a
position to do so, assisting and encouraging, with the necessary agreement, other
States Parties to do the same; and working to improve communication on disease
surveillance, including with the WHO, FAO, and OlE, and among States Parties. Press
Release, U.N. Office at Geneva, Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons
Convention Concludes, U.N. Doc. 04044e (Dec. 13, 2004).
23.
See generally Meeting of the State Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Geneva, Switz., Dec. 5-9,
2005, Report of the Meeting of the States Parties (Dec. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.opbw.org/new-process/msp2005/BWCMSP_2005_3-E.pdf.
24.
See U.S. Dep't of State, APEC Food Defense Initiative (Nov. 3, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/75537.htm [hereinafter APEC Food Defense]
(noting that APEC members had met in November of 2006 at a workshop in Bangkok,
Thailand).
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the need for improved security of the food supply system on the part
of member states. 25 APEC conducted a food defense workshop in
Thailand in November 2006, where senior officials of member nations
discussed actions each nation had undertaken to protect their food
supply chains, and looked at methodologies for assessing
vulnerabilities in the food supply system. 26 The stated purpose of
the workshop was to "begin a regional dialogue on protecting the food
supply from deliberate contamination. '27 While this informationsharing is helpful, no specific international cooperative action was
adopted. 28 On the positive side, the private sector participated in the
APEC Food Defense Workshop in Bangkok. 29 APEC also held a
symposium on "Total Supply Chain Security" in Singapore in July
2006.30 This meeting focused on the threat of international terrorism
targeting the food supply chains. 3 1 The meeting addressed actions of
individual member states and recommended broader cooperative
efforts to include both public and private sector initiatives. 32 No
specific
international
actions
were
agreed
upon
beyond
recommending more discussion and cooperation. In 2007, APEC
plans to address issues surrounding the recovery of the international
33
food supply chain after an attack in the food supply system.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has published several
useful guidance documents that address the defense of food supply
systems. For example, the 2002 Guidance on "Terrorist Threats to
Food," which was published as a food safety issue, provides useful
guidance on protecting food supply chains and emergency response
systems. 34
Interestingly, this document is one of the few

25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
See generally APEC Food Defense Workshop, Bangkok, Thail., Nov. 1-3,
2006, Summary of the APEC Food Defense Workshop, available at http://www.apec.org
content/apec/documentsjreports/senior-officialsmeetingsl2006.html (follow "Summary
of the APEC Food Defense Workshop Held in Bangkok" hyperlink) (observing
collaboration and communication which took place at workshop in Bangkok, but
making no mention of any kind of international cooperative action taking place).
29.
APEC Food Defense, supra note 24.
30.

Total Supply Chain Security in the APEC Region, APEC E-NEWSLETTER

(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Singapore), July 2006, http://www.apec.org/apec/
enewsletter/july-vol9/onlinenewsc.html# (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
31.

Id.

32.
Id.
33.
See Fifteenth APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Sydney, Austl., Sept. 8-9,
2007, Background Information, at 15, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/
commerce/apec/pdf/APEC-2007-Media-Backgrounder-EN.pdf
(acknowledging as a
priority for 2007 "total supply chain security").
34.
Food Safety Dep't, World Health Org., Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance
for Establishing and StrengtheningPrevention and Response Systems (2002), available

at
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/general/en/terrorist.pdf
Terrorist Threats].

[hereinafter
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international publications that provides specific guidance to both
governments and the private sector food industry. 35 Yet even this
document does not address the specific need for broader international
36
cooperation and action on protecting the global food supply chain.
The WHO also maintains the Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network 37 to provide rapid assistance for public health emergencies
that could be related to contaminated food, among a number of
potential bio-terrorism possibilities. But this is an example of a broad
bio-response effort, and as with most existing international programs,
does not address the need for improving the overall defense and
protection of global food supply chains in order to reduce the
terrorism risk to this vital global infrastructure.
There have been some efforts by organizations, such as FAO to
develop food supply system defensive programs, but these are still
primarily targeting food safety and sanitary issues in specific
38
countries where insurgencies and famine are prevalent already.
The United States is actively working with the FAO to assist in these
efforts, and discussions are underway to develop further informationsharing on best practices, defensive measures programs, emergency
response, and risk assessment and reduction, as well as increasing
These
available calories and nutrition to these populations. 39
the
where
in
Asia
and
regions
on
Africa
focused
mainly
are
programs
40
significant.
indeed,
is,
efforts
such
for
need

V. REGIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ARE
GROWING

There have been other food system defensive efforts on a
continental basis. For example, the European Union has been rapidly

35.
See id. at 1 (asserting that prevention is most effective when it is a
"cooperative effort" between industry and governments, and establishing that this
document seeks to "provide guidance" for this cooperation).
36.
Id.
See Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network, http://www.who.int/csr/
37.
outbreaknetwork/enI (last visited Sept. 22, 2007); see also Terrorist Threat, supra note
34, at 32.
The FAO has partnered with a number of international organizations to
38.
operate a web portal that addresses food safety and food defense issues. International
Portal on Food Safety, Animal & Plant Health, http://www.ipfsaph.org/En/default.jsp
(last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
See, e.g., Press Release, Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., FAO and US
39.
Department of Agriculture Sign Agreement to Strengthen Collaboration (Mar. 14,
2007), available at http:/www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2007/1000509/index.html.

See generally Winn S. Collins, The Commission's Delegation Dilemma: Is
40.
the European Food Safety Authority an Accountable Agency?, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L &
POL'Y 277, 280-93 (2004) (providing background on the increased regulation in the
European Union in regards to food safety).
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expanding its regulatory authority and available food processing and
handling guidelines to improve the defense of its food supply chains
from terrorist acts, as well as to improve the overall safety of its food
systems. 4 1 In North America, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico have
been developing and implementing new regulatory authorities that
42
target defense of their respective food supply systems.
Furthermore, these countries have been exploring cooperative steps
43
to harden their shared food supply chains against terrorist acts.
44
Thus far, however, the steps have been timid at best.
The efforts to
date, developed under the Security and Prosperity Partnership for
North America (SPP),4 5 include a specific goal (#8) to "develop and
implement a North American bioprotection strategy to assess,
prevent, protect, detect, and respond to intentional, as well as
applicable naturally occurring threats to public health and the food
and agriculture system. ''4 6 While some progress has been made in
furthering security at borders and risk reduction efforts between
Canada and the U.S., most of the SPP efforts have been hampered or
delayed due to a lack of funding support. 4 7 Thus, the real defensive
value appears to be limited despite such a prominent program.
There have been attempts to broaden cooperation between the
European Union and the U.S., including exchange of information,
threat data, and technology. 48 However, the efforts are limited due to
the combination of commercial interests, the reluctance to address
potential criminality issues, and the predisposition in many countries
that existing food safety programs will provide sufficient defense

41.
See generally id. at 280-93 (providing background on the increased
regulation in the European Union in regards to food safety).
42.
See Press Release, The White House, Security and Prosperity Partnership
of North America Agenda (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/03/20050323-1.html [hereinafter SPP Agenda].
43.
See Press Release, The White House, Joint Statement by President Bush,
President Fox, and Prime Minister Martin: Security and Prosperity Partnership of
North America (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
releases/2005/ 03/20050323-2.html. See generally Security and Prosperity Partnership
of North America, http://www.spp.gov.
44.
See generally Greg Anderson & Christopher Sands, Negotiating North
America: The Security and ProsperityPartnership,HUDSON INSTITUTE, at 22, (Summer
2007),
available at
http://hudson.org/files/pdf-upload/HudsonNegotiatingNorth
Americaadvanceproof2.pdf (noting that after the first year, "tangible progress on the
SPP agenda was difficult to access").
45.
See Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, supra note 43.
46.
SPP Agenda, supra note 42.
47.
See Security and Prosperity Partnership, 2006 Report to Leaders,
http://www.spp.gov/2006-report to leaders/index.asp?dName=2006_report to leaders;
Anderson, supra note 44 (observing that many of the areas of progress in the SPP
agenda after the first year were primarily bilateral between the U.S. and Canada).
48.
See generally Fourth Meeting of the New Defence Agenda's Bioterrorism
Reporting Group Co-Organized with the Chemical and Biological Arm Control Institute
(CBACI), Brussels, Belg., Apr. 25, 2005, Countering Bioterrorism:How Can Europe and
the United States Work Together [hereinafter Countering Bioterrorism].
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against terrorist acts targeting food. 49 There is limited consensus on
what to actually do to protect the food supply chains. 50 Even where
there is consensus by experts from the various nations joining the
discussions, the resulting recommendations have not been followed
up. For example, following an informative conference in Brussels in
2005 entitled "Countering Bioterrorism: How can Europe and the
United States work together?" the Chemical and Biological Arms
Control Institute (CBACI) published a document entitled "Counter
Bioterrorism: How can Europe and the United States work
together?" 51 While protecting the global food supply system was
touched upon in the conference, most of the related discussion focused
on existing food safety efforts. 52 The conference report contains
several recommendations, none of which specifically address
protecting food systems from intentional contamination or
53
disruption.

VI. BILATERAL INITIATIVES HAVE GAINED SOME MOMENTUM

There are several bilateral initiatives to develop food system
defense programs. The United States has developed useful strategies
for combating bioterrorism, including the type of bioterrorism which
could target food systems. 54 To implement these strategies, the U.S.
has directly engaged several nations on cooperative efforts, such as
Italy, the United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, and Japan. 55 Yet these
efforts are focused primarily on defending and protecting the food
supply chains of the participating nations; while these arrangements
would certainly provide some limited collateral benefit to the global
food supply system, they are not generally directed toward such a
56
broad-based purpose.

49.
See generally id. at 15 (noting the lack of "real cooperation" displayed
between the parties at a recent conference). See also.Marc L. Ostfield, Senior Advisor
on Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at NATO
Conference on Elements of Combating WMD Terrorism, Intersectoral and
International Cooperation on Combating Bioterrorism (Sept. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/56614.htm.
50.
See id. See generally Countering Bioterrorism, supra note 48.
51.
Countering Bioterrorism, supra note 48.
52.
See generally id.
53.
See id. at 6, 9.
54.
See Ostfield, supra note 49.
55.
See generally Sixth Ministerial Meeting on the Global Health Security
Initiative, Rome, Italy, Nov. 18, 2005, Statement, available at http://www.state.gov/gl
oes/rls/or/57804.htm.
56.
Id.
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Canada, in collaboration with the WHO, established the webbased Global Public Health Information Network (GPHIN), 57 which
erhploys technology to scan the Web to identify suspected disease
outbreaks. This system could aid in detecting and responding to a
terrorist attack on food, but it was not specifically created to target
food defense needs. 58 Furthermore, the GPHIN is an example of a
primarily unilateral action, even though it was created in
collaboration with the WHO. 59

VII.

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE
PROGRESS

The United States also has several unilateral programs to
monitor the safety of the food products within the global supply
chain. In January of 2003, the President issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 9, which declared the nation's food supply
chain as a Critical Infrastructure and mandated necessary protective
actions. 60 Presidential Directive 9 represents the first time the food
supply chain was identified as critical to the nation. 6 1 This document
sets forth actions that will improve the protection of the food supply
chain, both within the United States and for our food and agriculture
trading partners. U.S. policy clearly appreciates the potential global
impact of any serious terrorist strike against the food supply chain.
Indeed, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10, "Biodefense for
the 21st Century," specifically states: "[a]ttacks with biological
weapons could . . . [c]reate cascading international effects by
trade relationships,
disrupting and damaging international
potentially globalizing the impacts of an attack on United States

57.
See Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), http://www.phacaspc.gc.calmedianr-rp/2004/2004_gphin-rmispbke.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
58.
See Global Public Health Intelligence Network, § 2: General Information
Regarding the Database, http://www2.itssti.hc-sc.gc.ca/clf/hecsinventory.nsf/idview/
040319101925-JP-YN?OpenDocument&lang=E#sect2 (last visited Sept. 22, 2007). The
purpose of the database is
to provide 24 hour-per-day, 7 day-a-week monitoring of global infectious
disease outbreaks and natural disasters in terms of the details of outbreak
events. The goal is to identify potential international health risks and to
provide an early warning to programs and public health clients (e.g., the World
Health Organization) who assess and manage risk.

Id.
59.
Id. § 1(noting that the database is maintained solely by Health Canada).
60.
See Press Release, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food (Feb. 3, 2004),
available at http:/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/print/20040203-2.html.
61.
See id.
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soil.'' 62 Furthermore, this document proposes four "Pillars" of a biodefense program (Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection,
Surveillance and Detection, and Response and Recovery) to "continue
to build international coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging
increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and
6' 3
threat reduction programs.
Recent bioterrorism laws 6 4 enacted after 9/11 require advance
notification of all movements of food products into the U.S. The
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has an "Offshore
Pest Information System" '65 program in place in several foreign ports
to pre-inspect agricultural products prior to their shipment to the
U.S. The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains a program under
the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center 66 that monitors
potential overseas biological threats to troops deployed in foreign
countries that has a direct benefit on our national bio-security efforts.
Finally, while not staffed to optimum levels, according to the
recent GAO report, 67 DHS conducts surveillance on goods shipped
into the U.S. as part of a long-established program to prevent the
intentional or accidental introduction of biological agents from
international shipping arriving in the US via ships, planes, or
ground-border crossing points. 68
Each of these efforts certainly
supports overall food supply chain risk reduction in North America,
but may provide only minimal added protection to that of the rest of
the world.

VIII. How Do WE MOVE FROM RHETORIC TO INTERNATIONAL ACTION?
For real progress to be made in defending the global food supply
system, the more developed and capable nations must take the lead
and follow through on commitments they have already made. At the

62.
Press Release, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential
DirectiveHSPD-10: Biodefense for the 21st Century (Apr. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd- 10.html.
63.
Id.
64.
See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
65.
See Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Crop Biosecurity and
Emergency Management, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppqbiosecurity/opis.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2007).
66.
See AFMIC, http://www.detrick.army.milltenants/afmic.cfm (last visited
Sept. 22, 2007) (discussing the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center's efforts).
67.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: MUCH IS BEING
DONE

TO PROTECT

AGRICULTURE

FROM A

TERRORIST ATTACK,

BUT

IMPORTANT

CHALLENGES REMAIN 4, 12 (Mar. 2005).
68.
See U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Agriculture, May 2006,
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/agriculture/agriculture.ctt/agr
iculture.pdf.
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2004 Sea Island Summit, the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation
69
articulated the G8 commitment to defending against bioterrorism.
G8 countries pledged to initiate new bio-surveillance activities,
increase protection of the global food supply, and mitigate intentional
Indeed, the G8 Action Plan on
uses of biological weapons.7 0
Nonproliferation, issued at Sea Island, Georgia, on June 9, 2004,
states in paragraph 5:
Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all nations,
and could endanger public health and disrupt economies. We commit to
concrete national and international steps to: expand or, where
necessary, initiate new biosurveillance capabilities to detect bioterror
attacks against humans, animals, and crops; improve our prevention
and response capabilities; increase protection of the global food supply;
and respond to, investigate, and mitigate the effects of alleged uses of
71
biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease.

The Sea Island Summit was followed by a G8 Bioterrorism
Experts Group (BTEX) meeting in September of 2004 where the issue
of the role of the G8 in bioterrorism in general, and defending food
supply chains in particular, was broadly discussed. 72 During this
meeting, representatives of several G8 nations took the position that
G8 actions duplicated the work of others, such as the Global Health
Security Action Group (GHSAG). 73 Upon review, however, the efforts
proposed for the G8 do not duplicate the GHSAG efforts, and further,
the GHSAG does not have the force of action or global standing of the
entire G8. 74 Additionally, directly addressing the protection of the
global food supply chain has not been a focus of the GHSAG. Indeed,
the report of the Sixth Ministerial meeting on the Global Health
Security Initiative from Rome, Italy on November 18, 2005, did not
even mention protection of the food chain. 75 There was also a
ministerial statement from the December 2006 GHSAG ministerial
meeting in Tokyo, but once again, there was no mention of food
76
defense.
Some G8 representatives have expressed reservations about G8
initiatives because there might be a perception that bioterrorism is

69.
70.

G8 Action Plan, supra note 18.
Id.

71.

Id.

Conference on Strengthening European Action on WMD Non-Proliferation
72."
and Disarmament: How Can Community Instruments Contribute?, Brussels, Belg.,
Dec. 7-8, 2005, From Bio Threat Reduction to Cooperation in Biological Proliferation
Prevention: Background Paper 4, at 32, (prepared by Roger Roffey), available at
http://www.pugwash.se/SIPRIEUPilotBioCTRRoffeyBP4.pdf.
73.
Id.
See generally id.
74.
Id.
75.
Seventh Ministerial Meeting on the Global Health Security Initiative,
76.
Tokyo, Japan, Dec. 7, 2006, Ministerial Statements, available at http://www.ghsi.ca/
english/statementtokyoDec2006.asp.
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only the concern of wealthier nations. 77 Clearly, if any group of
nations is going to act on behalf of protecting the world's food supply
chain, it must be the more prosperous ones. Others have expressed
concern that measures to protect the global food supply chain might
actually end up acting as unintentional trade barriers. 78

There was

also extended discussion about national stockpiles of medical
countermeasures (vaccines and drugs) and the problems of exporting

and importing "approved" drugs between nations. 79

As a result,

many representatives preferred to focus on the sharing of information
about national plans for preparedness and response.8 0
Still, the
outcome of this September 2004 G8 BTEX meeting was very
promising in three areas8
I.

Strengthening
Capabilities

l

identified in the Sea Island report:

National

and

International

Biosurveillance

The group agreed that plant and animal disease surveillance
remained a significant weakness in international bioterrorism
preparedness and proposed a virtual working group to study ways
to strengthen efforts by the FAO and the International Plant
Protection Convention (IPPC).8 2 Further, the group agreed to
foster information sharing among G8 member states on national
83
zoonotic disease surveillance.

II. Increasing Protection of Global Food Production and Supply
Recognizing that many member states have their own tools for food
supply chain defense, the group requested each member state to
share information about its own programs and food system defense
tools.8 4 The U.S. agreed to host a risk assessment workshop,
which was held in April of 2005.85 Most member states provided
.some level of information. For example, the UK agreed to host a
similar workshop on best practices, which was held later that
year. 8 6
This workshop focused primarily on important areas
identified by the regulatory agency of each nation, but it did not
provide a forum for exchange of ideas from the private sector,

77.
Roffey, supra note 72.
The author also draws on his experiences
participating in G8 discussions on bioterrorism, and his recollection of the statements
made by delegates there.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
The Author participated in the 2004 and 2005 G8 BTEX meetings as a
representative of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, where at the time he
served as the Program Manager, Food & Agriculture within the Infrastructure
Partnership Division, Preparedness directorate.
81.
Roffey, supra note 72, at 32.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
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which actually operates the food supply chains of the member
states.8 7
,,
.
III. Improving Response and Mitigation Capabilities
Finally, the group agreed upon the importance of information
sharing and its value in identifying strengths and weaknesses in
international capabilities and cooperation. 8 8 To this end, the
group agreed to contribute to a shared listing of planned
emergency preparedness events that representatives of other
member states might observe. 8 9 The group also agreed to continue
discussions on legal and licensing issues involved in sharing
medical countermeasures. 9 0 The group agreed to share national
response plans and information on training resources in forensic
91
epidemiology.

So, where is the G8 effort today? Unfortunately, not much
concrete progress has been made in defense of the global food supply
chain. The meetings planned in the U.K. took place with little actual
result, and no BTEX meeting took place in Russia. 92 However, on the
positive side, there has been an increase in information sharing. For
example, some response and defense plans have been shared (mainly
between the U.S., the U.K., and Germany). 93 There have also been
further discussions on sharing vaccines, but no definitive plans have
been made. 94 Additionally, there have been a few national level
exercises where G8 members have served as observers. 95 Risk- and
vulnerability-assessment tools have been shared, but no steps have
been taken to broaden their use in defending food supply channels. 96
The G8 steps proposed in 2004 remain the best proposed action
plan to date. 97 But to see real progress, there must be concurrent
commitment to action and enabling resources. If such commitment
happens, these steps can have tremendous impact on the overall
defense of thefood suppl systems. For example, we need to build
partnerships to create familiarity and function coordination between
the various national systems participating. Where appropriate, the
community needs to help "partner states" build capacity through
technology implementation, process sharing, and exercise facilitation,
to both stretch them and provide useful models to employ. Exercises

87.
88.
.89.
90.
91.
92.
93
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
G8 Action Plan, supra note 18.
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risk/vulnerability
also
provide
threat-stream
sharing
and
assessments.
We need to institutionalize the process of international and
regional terrorism exercises, particularly for the more ubiquitous
open infrastructures, such as the global food supply system. In the
1970s and 1980s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
turned the exercise system into the means to build both partnership
and functionality into the alliance. 98 The result was a formidable
defense system made up of parts that did not always mesh perfectly.
Not only did the system function effectively, however, but it also
stimulated defense improvements in each member state. 99
Exercises provide a means to build similar partnerships and
mold some cohesion into the global food protection efforts of the
wealthier nations.
They can help nations identify gaps and
preparedness, improve risk assessment processes, develop mitigation
and protective strategies, and identify technology gaps where
Research and Development (R&D) can come into play to develop
solutions. These steps will, in turn, stimulate the wealthier nations'
own "client" states, with whom they trade, to participate with them in
defensive efforts of their mutual food supply chains.
The private sector must also be directly engaged in this process
given its fundamental control of the supply system. To facilitate such
engagement, the international community must provide mechanisms
to protect proprietary information; accordingly, legal definitions and
statutes must be developed to uniformly criminalize food terrorism
acts. Only when the wealthier, more capable nations take such steps
will the rest of the world benefit from a more protected and secure
global food supply chain. The United States and the other G8 nations
are in the best position, and are the best equipped, to lead such an
effort.

IX. GLOBAL FOOD CHAIN DEFENSE PROSPECTS ARE POOR
UNLESS THERE IS ACTION ON THE PART OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Any expectation of a rapid conclusion to the war on terrorism,
the use of terrorism by a variety of radical groups, or a near-term
conclusive peace in Iraq or Afghanistan is unfounded. The sad reality
is that until there is a fundamental change in the culture and
educational system in the Muslim community in many parts of the
world, there will be no relief from the threat of terrorism. As long as
radical extremists have a cause for which they are willing to kill, or

98.
99.

Id.
Id.
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as long as young Muslims are given a religious education that is
based upon an ideology that fanatical Islam must take over the world
and that acts of mass murder are the fastest path to Heaven, we will
face the dangers of international terrorism.
Unfortunately, the
means of mass murder have moved beyond guns and bombs. The
leaders of such fanatical movements, not limited to Muslim
extremists, have demonstrated an interest in finding new ways to
attack society. In the case of Muslim extremists, this includes the
drive to kill non-believers as well as to intimidate the world to bend
to their goals of regional and, ultimately, world domination. 10 0
Unfortunately, we may be presently suffering from the "stop
light" syndrome. At the international cooperative level, we seem
unable or unwilling to act until the first major "wreck" occurs. This
has historically been the case within many countries (including the
U.S.) and is certainly the case with most international cooperative
programs. Whether that "wreck" occurs in the U.S. or elsewhere in
the world will not matter; from that point forward, absent actions
beforehand to protect the global food supply chain, the U.S. public
and that of the rest of the world will no longer be able to fully trust
their food supply chains.
The loss in confidence of the major
international private food sector firms would be very detrimental to
the equity markets globally-threatening the solvency of firms and
markets. 01'
Probably worse, the public's confidence in its
government's ability to protect it will forever be shattered in a
manner not seen since Europe and Asia faced World War II. The
result may well be chaos in U.S. food supply chains, potentially
creating new levels of international distrust and suspicion that could
make the Cold War seem a very minor concern by comparison.

100.

See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Goodbye to All That? A Requiem for

Neoconservatism, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 277, 318 (2007) ("[T]he [Muslim] extremists
fantasize and dream, steeped in the unlimited resentments and unlimited field of
action that fantasy allows, of war, jihad, and terror.").

101.

See Jim McWhinney, Understanding the Consumer Confidence Index,

INVESTOPEDIA, Jan. 6, 2005, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/O5/010604.asp.

